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RESUMEN: A pesar de la inmensa cantidad de investigación moderna 
referente a la Segunda Guerra Púnica, el papel que la armada romana jugó 
ha sido en gran parte ignorado. En su lugar, casi todos los estudios se con-
centran en gran escala en los compromisos de la infantería, destacando el 
general cartagines Anibal frente a los líderes de la república. Este estudio 
pretende abordar esta laguna resaltando el papel de la armada en la victo-
ria a largo plazo sobre los cartagineses. Un análisis de los antiguos barcos 
y las estrategias de la contienda revelan que había muchas limitaciones, las 
cuales obstaculizaron la capacidad de la flota a partir de la línea costera, 
carente de ciudades amistosas portuarias. Debido a una combinación de 
la geografía, estrategias y sucesos bélicos Roma pudo explotar estas limi-
taciones frente a los cartagineses. La trascendencia de los esfuerzos de la 
armada fue un significante hecho en la victoria romana.
* «The term “Roman navy” has been used as a convenient shorthand for “Roman 
armed naval forces”. All dates are BCE unless otherwise noted».
ISSN: 0213-2052 - eISSN: 2530-4100
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14201/shha201836529
6 ALEX MICHAEL ELLIOTT
THE ROLE OF THE ROMAN NAVY IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR:  
THE STRATEGIC CONTROL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND Stud. hist., H.ª antig., 36, 2018, pp. 5-29
Palabras clave: Armada romana; Segunda Guerra Púnica; Estrategia 
militar.
ABSTRACT: Despite the vast amount of modern research concerning 
the Second Punic War, the role in which Roman fleets played has been 
largely ignored. Instead, nearly all studies focus on the large-scale infan-
try engagements featuring Hannibal the Carthaginian general versus the 
leaders of the Roman Republic. This study aims to address this lacuna by 
highlighting the Roman navy’s role in the long-term victory over Carthage. 
An analysis of ancient ships and warfare strategies reveals that there were 
many limitations which hindered the ability of a fleet from operating along 
coastlines lacking friendly port cities. Due to a combination of geography, 
strategy, and success in battle Rome was consistently able to exploit these 
limitations at Carthaginian expense. The implication being that the efforts 
of naval forces were a significant factor in the eventual Roman victory.
Keywords: Roman Navy; Second Punic War; Military Strategy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Never without an enemy actually at the gates had there been such 
terror and confusion in the city […] two consular armies annihilated, 
both consuls’ dead, Rome left without a force in the field, without a 
commander, without a single soldier1.
Livy’s description of the aftermath of Cannae gives a good insight 
into later Roman psyche concerning the Second Punic War. The focus of 
the war was always Hannibal, who through his audacity and generalship 
nearly overwhelmed Rome on its own doorstep. This Hannibal centred 
assessment is to some degree justified, but as a result, much of the action 
in the greater Mediterranean has been left in Hannibal’s shadow. Nowhere 
is this oversight more apparent than in the actions of Rome’s navy during 
the war. Even in modern scholarship, the activities of Roman fleets are still 
seen as more of a sideshow and supplement to the real action of large 
scale infantry engagements2. While the Second Punic war did lack the 
large and notorious naval engagements which characterised the First Punic 
War, its role in the long-term victory of Rome was just as important. The 
following inquiry will examine the nature of ancient naval warfare and the 
individual naval activities in each theatre of war. From this analysis, it will 
1. Livy, 22.54.9.
2. RANKOV, 1996, 49.
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be suggested that through the protection of its territorial coasts, shipping 
lines, and success in battle, the Roman navy made a significant contribu-
tion to Rome’s long-term success in the Second Punic War.
2. THE STATE OF THE QUESTION
There have been remarkably few works examining the Second Punic 
War from a naval perspective. The only major study remains Thiel’s 1946 
Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times, which 
dedicates a substantial amount of material to the Second Punic War3. While 
a helpful guide to the Roman navy’s activities during the period, the work 
is at times dated in its analysis, notably regarding the motivations of both 
navies as well as in its overall idea of a weak Carthaginian navy versus the 
«landlubberish nature» of the Romans4. As a result, Thiel largely underesti-
mates the importance of the navy on both sides during the war, and in the 
words of Rankov, «is somewhat apologetic» in his analysis5. However, de-
spite the age of Thiel’s work and sometimes inadequate conclusions, the 
area has remained largely ignored. As a consequence, since Thiel, few au-
thors have devoted any significant attention to the subject. The first being 
Rankov, whose 1996 article briefly examined naval strategy in the war 
based on the functions and limitations of ancient warships. While offering 
useful counterpoints to Thiel’s arguments, the brevity of the article and its 
limited subject material can only, in Rankov’s words himself, «draw some 
general conclusions», and leaves a more thorough analysis to be desired6. 
Likewise, Rey da Silva’s 2012 article focuses on the historical development 
of both navies and the types of warships used, but only briefly mentions 
the events of the war itself7.
The third scholar to have discussed the topic in depth is Steinby, who 
has published two works concerning the Roman navy during the Second 
3. THIEL, 1946, 32-199. Although largely ignored in modern scholarship, Rodgers 1937 
work Greek and Roman Naval Warfare: A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design from 
Salamis (480 B.C.) to Actium (31 B.C.) discusses Rome’s naval involvement in the war 
and offers a more persuasive argument than Thiel. Rodgers, however, does not cite any 
of his statements and frequently presents his own opinions as historical fact. By modern 
standards, Rodgers’ work would not be considered academic, see: RODGERS, 1937, 308-376.
4. For his overall conclusion of the Romans being inherent «landlubbers» and Carthage 
being «such a miserable figure at sea» against Rome, see: THIEL, 1946, 186-193.
5. RANKOV (1996, 49) describes Thiel as constantly excusing the lack of energy in 
naval warfare during the war.
6. The conclusions themselves are largely strategic, see: RANKOV, 1996, 56.
7. REY DA SILVA, 2012, 45-69.
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Punic War. The first, published in 2004 and reprinted in 2007, takes the 
form of a naval case study, and argues against many of Thiel’s findings 
and for a greater importance of Rome’s naval operations as a factor in 
winning the war8. The second, published in 2014, acts as a chronologi-
cal history of naval events from the 6th century down to the destruction 
of Carthage in 1469. In both works, Steinby is at times able to effective-
ly point out that Thiel’s interpretation of the Romans as landlubbers is 
oversimplified, and that the Roman navy played more of an important 
role than has been given credit. Her analysis, however, suffers from many 
methodological flaws and her arguments are often speculative, rather than 
being supported by primary source evidence. In the words of Dart, «there 
is a tendency to infer a great deal from even relatively slender evidence 
and, as discussed above, some of the conclusions in these sections are 
not very convincing»10. As a result of these speculative inferences, Steinby 
often finds herself arguing directly against Polybius and Livy without hav-
ing counter evidence to back her claims. This is most apparent in her 
analysis of Pre-Punic War Rome and pervades throughout both works. 
Essentially, in an effort to showcase the importance of naval activities, 
Steniby has done a complete reverse in relation to Thiel, and greatly over-
estimates the role and capabilities of both sides during the Second Punic 
War11. The overall scarcity of scholarship and the problems with these 
few existing works warrant a more balanced analysis of the importance of 
Rome’s navy in the Second Punic War.
3. NAVAL WARFARE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To understand the actions of the Roman navy during the war it is 
first necessary to understand how naval warfare itself was conducted dur-
ing antiquity. Beginning with the ships themselves, warships on both the 
8. STEINBY, 2004, 77-114. The reprinted version of 2007 is included as a chapter 
in a larger work on the Roman navy. Due to its expanded subject material as well as 
convenience, the latter will be referenced henceforth, see: STEINBY 2007, 105-42.
9. STEINBY (2014, 2) states that «this book concentrates on the fleets and warfare at sea 
and the role the fleets played in the Punic Wars». Because of this scope, the book functions 
as more of a chronological history and does not contain as much analysis as the previous 
work.
10. DART, 2009, 31. 
11. According to DART (2009, 31), «Many will probably be inclined to side with the 
more conservative interpretation of early Roman naval endeavours suggested by Thiel, but 
the Roman Republican Navy does provide an interesting counterpoint to his work».
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Carthaginian and Roman side relied on oar powered vessels. This meant 
that ships required a large amount of manpower to move even short dis-
tances. In practice, this amounted to a large number of men packed into 
a ship with little room for supplies such as food, water, or supplemen-
tary arms12. For example, the main ship type used by both sides during 
the war, the quinquereme, has been estimated at 51.5 meters long with 
a crew of 364 men, of which around 300 were dedicated to rowing13. 
Consequently, space was incredibly limited and oarsmen sat nearly on 
top of one another with no room for leaving one’s position even when 
not rowing14. As a result of these uncomfortable, strenuous, and presum-
ably unsanitary conditions, warships did not travel in the open sea or row 
overnight unless necessary. Instead, they chose to hug the coastlines of 
the Mediterranean to regularly stop at friendly ports or inlets for food, 
water, and sleep15.
This method essentially means that a fleet needed to always be some-
what close to a friendly port, or else run the risk of a lack of neces-
sary rest and supplies. This also makes travelling long distances or within 
enemy territory a very dangerous endeavour. A fleet traveling a long dis-
tance along hostile coastline may have to go multiple days with little food 
and no rest. As ships tended to sail along the same coastal routes, a fleet 
in unfriendly territory also ran the risk of accidentally running into the 
enemy along its route16. For example, in Livy’s account he mentions mul-
tiple occasions where the Roman fleet just so happens to come across a 
Carthaginian fleet resulting in an impromptu battle17. For an exhausted 
fleet caught out in enemy waters this would surely spell disaster. This 
danger would have been even more so for transport vessels bringing sup-
plies to armies abroad, as they lacked the ability to defend themselves if 
12. RANKOV, 1996, 50-51; REY DA SILVA, 2012, 63.
13. PITASSI, 2011, 100. REY DA SILVA (2012, 50) gives a somewhat more conservative 
estimate for Carthaginian quinqueremes with around 280 rowers and 20 deck crew. Rey 
da Silva, however, does not incorporate marines in his estimate. In a battle of the 1st Punic 
War Polybius states that the Roman quinqueremes contained 300 rowers/crew and 120 
marines, or 420 men total, see: Polyb., 1.26.7.
14. RANKOV, 1996, 50. Roman warships did have a sail which they would try and use 
as much as possible to ease the strenuous conditions mentioned above. During battle or 
emergencies, the sail would be stowed away and the oars used exclusively, see: CASSON, 
1971, 278-280.
15. RANKOV, 1996, 52.
16. RANKOV, 1996, 53.
17. Livy, 28.4.5-7 and 23.41.8-9 are good examples. Impromptu battles on the open 
ocean were often perilous for both sides, see: MARTÍNEZ GÁZQUEZ, 1988, 725-729. 
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sighted by an enemy fleet18. As a result, fleets of warships often accompa-
nied even bigger fleets of transport vessels acting as a sort of bodyguard if 
they were attacked19. 
Regarding naval warfare itself, both Rome and Carthage utilised large-
ly the same technology, although Carthage had more expertise and a rich-
er history of naval expedition20. In fact, Polybius states that during the First 
Punic War, the inexperienced Romans actually based their quinqueremes 
on a shipwrecked Carthaginian model21. Although generally acknowl-
edged in modern scholarship, Steinby argues against this idea of an inex-
perienced First Punic War Roman navy and boldly states that, ‘the Romans 
were not novices at all’22. In her 2014 work she expands upon this idea by 
stating, ‘during the ninety years before the First Punic War Roman naval 
operations rapidly increased’23. Recently, Harris has gone even further by 
claiming that Rome ‘was a force to be reckoned with at sea’ as early as 
the mid 310’s24. Both authors are at odds with Polybius, and are not sup-
ported by other primary evidence. Firstly, Steinby uses the creation of the 
duumuiri navales, two officials responsible for the fleet, in 311 as a sign 
of a fully fitted trireme based navy by the end of the 4th century25. To sup-
port this argument, she uses an example from the Pyrrhic War (282-272) 
in which Appian mentions the Romans sailing along Southern Italy with 
10 ‘decked ships’26. Harris, mirroring Steinby, also extrapolates Appian’s 
statement by speculating, ‘perhaps the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy was also 
defended by a serious naval force’27. 
18. For example, Livy describes a fleet of 100 transports being escorted by 20 warships 
to send aid to Scipio in Africa, see: Livy, 30.24.5.
19. RANKOV, 1996, 55.
20. Carthage had been the dominant maritime power in the Western Mediterranean 
since the 6th century, see: REY DA SILVA, 2012, 45-47.
21. Polyb., 1.20.9-15.
22. STEINBY, 2007, 93.
23. STEINBY (2014, 35-36) bases her argument from Livy’s account of sea raiders 
attacking Italy in 348. However, in the passage cited, Livy explicitly mentions that the 
‘Romans could not fight at sea’. Contrary to the passage, Steinby argues that it is wrong to 
assume Rome lacked a navy at this time, although she gives no sources or argument for 
her statement, see Livy, 7.26.13.
24. HARRIS, 2017, 26.
25. STEINBY, 2014, 39. The passage of Livy only mentions the position’s creation and 
offers no additional information, see: Livy, 9.30.3.
26. STEINBY, 2014, 45-46. Appian does not describe the ships in detail, see: App., Sam. 
7.1.
27. HARRIS, 2017, 24. Harris acknowledges that his overall argument has been ‘some-
what marred by C. Steinby’, see: HARRIS, 2017, 15.
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Rather than proving the strength of the pre-Punic War Roman fleet, 
this scant evidence only serves to display its comparative weakness. For 
example, the office of the duumuiri navales was not a regularly elect-
ed magistracy and is only known from five instances in Roman history28. 
When first elected in 311, the duumuirs do appear to have been placed 
in charge of an already existing state-owned Roman fleet. This fleet, how-
ever, appears to have been a rudimentary force limited to a total of 20 
ships, or 10 per duumuir. Furthermore, these officials seem to have had 
little authority or duties. Instead, they were limited to fitting out the state 
fleet, finding a suitable crew, and general support and reconnaissance for 
the infantry29. Contrary to both Steinby and Harris, a state-owned fleet of 
20 ships with occasionally elected officials to manage them when neces-
sary is hardly suggestive of a commitment to strong naval prowess. While 
it can be agreed that Polybius exaggerates the ineptitude of the Romans 
by stating that they, ‘had not even a single boat’, there is no evidence to 
suggest they had any sort of naval force navy which could be remotely 
comparable to the Carthaginians before the First Punic War30. Instead, the 
evidence cited by Steinby and Harris seems to largely support Polybius, 
that the Romans were originally at a significant naval disadvantage.
From a warfare perspective, the goal of naval combat was to either 
sink an enemy’s ship or render it unusable by the crew. This was usually 
done by sailing around an enemy fleet and then ramming them from be-
hind with a specially fitted ram attached to the front of the ship31. As a re-
sult, the enemy ship would be either too heavily damaged to continue or 
the ship could be boarded and attacked by marines. As Carthage was an 
experienced sea power, they took advantage of their well-trained crews 
and utilised this technique with great effect32. Other common methods in-
cluded breaking the oars off an enemy ship in order to render it unusable 
or lighting a ship on fire with a variety of catapults and missiles33. The 
Romans, lacking the aforementioned experience and technical skill of the 
28. The first occurring in 311 and the last in 176. For an in-depth discussion on the 
duumuiri navales and their purpose, see DART, 2012, 1000-1015. HARRIS (2017, 19) does 
not acknowledge any scholarly work on the duumuiri navales and treats them as a yearly 
office.
29. DART, 2012, 1003, 1012.
30. Polyb., 1.20.13.
31. REY DA SILVA, 2012, 51-52. Underwater archaeological surveys off the Aegadian 
Islands of Sicily have uncovered 11 examples of bronze warship rams almost certainly as-
sociated with the final naval battle of the 1st Punic War, see: PRAG, 2014, 727-729.
32. MORRISON and COATES, 1996, 361.
33. MORRISON and COATES, 1996, 368-370.
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Carthaginians, instead put most of their efforts into boarding the enemy 
vessel. This was achieved in the First Punic War with the development of 
the corvus, or raven. The corvus was essentially a bridge on a swivel with 
a spike on the end which the Romans would attach to an enemy ship in 
order to board it34. Along with the corvus the Romans would also add 
an additional century of 80 marines onto their ships during battle35. As 
most of a ship’s crew were non-fighting rowers, this addition of 80 armed 
soldiers greatly swung battle in the Romans favour by turning it into an 
almost land battle at sea. With these innovations, the Romans were able to 
fight on even terms with that of the Carthaginians during the First Punic 
War despite their inferiority in seamanship36. According to Polybius, 
even though their naval expertise falls well short of that of the 
Carthaginians […] the valour of their troops brings them victory in the 
end37.
Although the Romans encountered a steep learning curve, with the 
loss of multiple fleets to storms and battles against the Carthaginian navy, 
they were not only able to survive, but eventually come out of the con-
flict as victors. In the 46-year period from the onset of the First Punic 
War until the beginning of the second, the Romans were able to greatly 
improve their abilities at sea. The corvus, which could lead to stability is-
sues, was replaced with a more reliable boarding bridge38. Ship design 
was improved, and crews would have been more familiar with naval war-
fare. It is during this period from 264-218 in which the Romans can be 
said to have first dedicated themselves to becoming a sea power, compa-
rable to, and arguably surpassing Carthag39. In short, through its increased 
naval expertise and superior boarding ability, Rome had made itself more 
than a match for the Carthaginians by the Second Punic War. Thiel, citing 
Carthage’s loss in the First Punic War, goes as far to say that ‘from 241-218, 
Rome was by far the greatest naval power of the Western Mediterranean’40. 
34. Polyb., 1.22.3-11.
35. PITASSI, 2011, 41.
36. In the words of DART (2009, 31), ‘This supports Polybius’ argument over that 
of Steinby’s, that the Romans were able to apply their skills in land combat to naval 
engagements to give their soldiers an advantage over experienced mariners’.
37. Polyb., 6.52.8.
38. PITASSI, 2011, 41-45.
39. DART and VERVEAT, 2011, 267-269.
40. THIEL, 1954, 357. Over the next 2 centuries, Rome’s naval supremacy would be a 
crucial factor in it’s eventual dominance over the entire Mediterranean, see: CARRO, 2016, 
106-109.
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Taking all of this into consideration, the most famous event of the 
war, Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, can be explained as the only option 
available rather than an audacious gamble. Hannibal had no choice but to 
march over the Alps as all of the northern Mediterranean was either con-
trolled by Rome or largely Roman friendly41. Thus no ports would have 
been available for Hannibal’s troops to rest and resupply42. A direct cross-
ing from Hispania to Italy would have taken multiple days, and as Rome 
is known to have had at least 220 quinqueremes in service at the onset 
of the war, they could have intercepted Hannibal’s exhausted fleet as it 
neared Italy43. This meant that Hannibal had to choose between risking 
his whole force being destroyed on the way to Italy or taking the danger-
ous Alpine route which would surely deplete forces, but not necessarily 
destroy them. Therefore, Thiel’s analysis of Hannibal’s crossing as a result 
of Roman naval superiority can be confirmed to some extent, but not 
throughout the entire Mediterranean44. Instead, it can be said that the now 
experienced Romans maintained naval superiority within their sphere of 
the Northern Mediterranean, as the geography prevented Hannibal from 
taking advantage of a safe port along the way. While still a bold move, 
Hannibal was simply playing strategy and chose the lesser of two evils 
when invading Italy.
4. HISPANIA
Now that the scene has been set regarding naval strategy, it is nec-
essary to take a chronological look at the naval activity in each theatre 
during the war. This analysis will primarily refer to naval contributions 
and will omit land activity unless it is correspondingly relevant. Beginning 
at the onset of the war in 218, the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio (cos. 
218) was sent to Tarraco in north-east Hispania with 60 quinqueremes, 
but left the area under the care of his brother Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio 
Calvus (cos. 222) as he returned to Italy to combat Hannibal45. In opposi-
tion, Hannibal had left his brother Hasdrubal in defence of Hispania with 
50 quinqueremes and 5 triremes, although manpower limitations only 
41. The Romans knew that Hannibal wouldn’t be able to travel by sea, see: Livy, 
21.17.8.
42. FRONDA, 2011, 251.
43. LAZENBY, 1978, 30-31.
44. THIEL (1946, 36-37) is very general in his descriptions of naval supremacy, and 
largely does not account for geographic factors.
45. Livy, 21.17.8; Polyb., 3.76.1.
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allowed him to equip 32 of the quinqueremes and the triremes46. After a 
winter of inactivity in Carthago Nova, Hasdrubal managed to reinforce his 
active fleet to 40 ships, left it under the command of a Hamilcar, who then 
sailed north along the coast. In response, Gnaeus Scipio sailed south from 
Tarraco with 35 ships, leading to a confrontation at the mouth of the Ebro 
River in Northern Hispania47.
The battle itself was unspectacular. In fact, Appian neglects the con-
flict entirely, stating that ‘Gnaeus did nothing in Hispania worthy of men-
tion before the return of his brother’48. As the Romans approached the 
Ebro mouth, the Carthaginian fleet embarked to confront them. At the 
same time, Hasdrubal lined up his infantry forces along the river bank 
as a backup in case the naval engagement ended poorly. This action, 
however, only provided the Carthaginian fleet with an easy escape route. 
As a result, the Romans met the Carthaginians in the river and had a bit 
of success, which led the Carthaginians to immediately panic and make 
for the coast and the safety of their infantry. After beaching their ships, 
the Romans simply followed and towed away 25 of the Carthaginians’ 40 
ships49. While not remarkable in terms of casualties, the battle had tremen-
dous long-term repercussions. With the loss of 25 ships, Carthage’s fleet in 
Hispania was effectively crippled, evidenced by the fact that not a single 
major naval battle was fought near its shores throughout the remaining 
16 years of the war. Livy directly supports this argument by stating, ‘the 
Romans in one easy battle had made themselves the master of the sea 
along the whole coast’50.
Following the battle, Carthage’s only remaining major port in Hispania 
was that of Carthago Nova in the south. The loss of such substantial coast-
al territory early in the war would not only damage Carthaginian control 
in Hispania but would also greatly weaken Hannibal’s position in Italy. 
Hispania was essentially Carthage’s breadbasket in terms of manpower 
and resources, particularly metals51. The logistical and safety risks of trans-
porting an army from Hispania to Italy by sea were already prohibitive at 
the onset of the war. Now that Rome controlled most of the coast as well, 
this made the transport of troops from Hispania a near impossibility. It 
didn’t matter how many troops and resources Carthage had available, as 
46. Livy, 21.22.4.
47. Polyb., 3.95.
48. App., Hisp. 3.15.
49. Polyb., 3.96.1-6.
50. Livy, 22.20.3.
51. MACDONALD, 2015, 170-171.
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they were now effectively confined within Hispania. The Roman army in 
Hispania could now focus all their efforts on defeating Carthage on land. 
Hasdrubal, like his brother, would have to march to Italy if he was to lend 
Hannibal any aid52. As a result, he was stopped on his initial attempt by 
the combined efforts of the Scipio brothers in 216, and wouldn’t be able 
to make another attempt until nearly 10 years later53. 
Carthago Nova, the last bastion of Carthaginian naval hopes in 
Hispania would eventually fall in 210 to the later famous Publius Cornelius 
Scipio Africanus (cos. 205, II 194), son of Publius Scipio54. After capturing 
the city in a single day he managed to seize the remaining Carthaginian 
ships and add them to his own55. After this accomplishment, the war in 
Hispania from a naval perspective was totally won by the Romans. With 
no enemy at sea, the Romans could put their ships to better use in other 
areas of the war. For example, Polybius states that Scipio Africanus broke 
up most of his fleet and incorporated the best trained seamen into his in-
fantry forces56. A few years later he would send over 50 of his ships back 
to Rome for the protection of Sardinia as they were of no use to him57. 
The loss of Hispania’s coast to the Romans was significant in that it limited 
all of Carthage’s safe naval havens to that of Africa itself. This meant that 
anytime the Carthaginian navy moved anywhere in the Mediterranean, 
they were most likely in enemy territory. Constantly operating in enemy 
territory would be difficult not only from a supply side, but also meant 
that through correspondence with its allies, Rome would always have a 
good idea where Carthaginian fleets were operating at any moment. This 
made Roman naval movements much safer, while at the same time putting 
the Carthaginian navy in great jeopardy.
5. SICILY
While the Romans had been the aggressors in Hispania, they were 
forced on the defence in order to protect their territory of Sicily. Officially 
under Roman control after the First Punic war, there were still many pro-
Carthaginian factions, most notably in the important cities of Syracuse and 
52. Livy, 23.27.9.
53. Livy, 27.36.1-4.
54. App., Hisp. 4.23.
55. Polybius states that he added 18 new ships, see: Polyb., 10.17.13. Livy only gives 
a figure of 8, see: Livy, 26.47.3.
56. Polyb., 10.35.5.
57. Livy, 27.22.
16 ALEX MICHAEL ELLIOTT
THE ROLE OF THE ROMAN NAVY IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR:  
THE STRATEGIC CONTROL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND Stud. hist., H.ª antig., 36, 2018, pp. 5-29
Lilybaeum58. In 218, Carthage made its first attempt at re-establishing con-
trol in Lilybaeum. In this naval engagement, Hiero, the King of Syracuse 
and loyal ally of Rome learned of the attack beforehand. In response, he 
was able to alert the Roman praetor Marcus Aemilius (pr. 218). This warn-
ing gave the praetor ample time to prepare his forces, and as a result the 
outnumbered 20 Roman quinqueremes were able to defeat the force of 35 
Carthaginian quinqueremes, capture 7 ships, and take 1,700 prisoners59. 
Following this battle, Syracuse would remain largely uneventful for the 
next few years. As long as Rome had their devoted ally Hiero, it seemed 
that he could control the situation largely on his own. For example, in 
216 Livy states that although praetors were assigned to both Sicily and 
Sardinia, neither area actually required their presence60.
The situation, however, would change drastically with the death of 
the elderly Hiero in 215. The crown initially passed to the Hiero’s teenage 
grandson Hieronymous who after a short rule of uncertain loyalty was as-
sassinated61. Capitalising on the subsequent confusion, two of Hannibal’s 
envoys named Epicydes and Hippocrates managed to secure the city of 
Syracuse in the name of Carthage62. With this defection, other Sicilian cities 
also revolted throwing the question of Sicily’s allegiance in doubt63. These 
uprisings represented a huge blow to Roman naval control in Sicily. Since 
the onset of the war, Rome had been using the island as a springboard 
to inflict raids on the African coast64. With the loss of Syracuse, Carthage 
could now turn the tables and use its port as a base for raids against Italy. 
Even more concerning was that with a port close to Italy, Carthage now 
had the ability to send reinforcements to Hannibal and directly threaten 
the Italian homeland65. Cannae had happened only two years before, and 
Rome was still fighting an uphill battle. Reinforcements to Hannibal could 
give him the resources for a finishing blow.
In response, Marcus Claudius Marcellus (cos. 222, II 215, III 214, IV 
210, V 208) was dispatched to Sicily and led a siege of the now hostile 
58. LAZENBY, 1978, 103.
59. Livy, 21.49-50. Prior to Hiero’s death, Syracuse’s own naval forces seemed to have 
acted autonomously in support of Rome. Although an important supplement, they are 
rarely mentioned in the source material, see: CHAMPION, 2012, 198-199.
60. Livy, 22.25.5.
61. ROSENSTEIN, 2012, 146.
62. MACDONALD, 2015, 154-155.
63. For a full account of the political situation following Hiero’s death, see: CHAMPION, 
2012, 200-210.
64. For an example, see: Livy, 23.41.8.
65. ROSENSTEIN, 2012, 146.
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Syracuse. Marcellus launched a considerable attack on Syracuse by both 
land and sea including a fleet of 60 quinqueremes66. With these forces, 
Marcellus attempted to storm the walls by tying his own ships together 
and creating a ladder and bridge siege engine on top of the connected 
ships. This siege engine, known as a Sambuca, reportedly terrified the 
citizens, but the famous Syracusan mathematician Archimedes had de-
signed counter-siege engines to protect the city67. These remarkable en-
gines included a variety of catapults and even a claw attached to a crane 
which could lift ships out of the water. The Sambuca itself was destroyed 
by dropping large stones from one of these crane-like devices68. While 
these accounts sound quite fanciful and embellished, Marcellus’ seaborne 
siege was certainly a failure. Instead, Marcellus would have to invest in 
a protracted two-year long siege in which he gradually took control of 
Syracuse’s surrounding suburbs69. This failure at sea, however, would only 
serve to delay the Roman advance rather than prevent it.
In 212, with Marcellus in control of most of the city, the Carthaginians 
grew desperate and decided to put a massive effort into saving Syracuse. 
A Carthaginian army under the command of a Himilco marched to the 
city and the fleet admiral Bomilcar sailed from Africa with a huge fleet 
of 130 quinqueremes and over 700 transports full of supplies for the re-
maining pro-Carthaginian forces in the city70. Based on the aforemen-
tioned figures of crew needed for a quinquereme, the number of men 
on the warships alone must have been between 39,000-52,00071. Due 
to bad weather, however, this force was blown off course to west of 
Cape Pachynum, the southernmost point of Sicily, with Syracuse on the 
eastern side72. Marcellus realizing that he, the besieger, was now going to 
become the besieged, sailed his fleet of 100 ships to the cape to meet the 
Carthaginians73. Bomilcar had forced a numerically inferior Marcellus to 
meet him in battle. The Carthaginians held the upper hand. Nevertheless, 
they refrained from immediately attacking as the wind was favourable to 
the Romans. Finally, when the wind died down the Carthaginians moved 
out towards the Romans. As the opposing fleets came close for battle, 
66. Plut., Vit. Marc. 14.3.
67. Polyb., 8.5.1-11.
68. Plut., Vit. Marc. 15.3-4.
69. EDWELL, 2011, 329; For a summary of the siege, see: CHAMPION, 2012, 210-220.
70. Livy, 25.27.3.
71. Assuming ships carrying on average somewhere between 300-400 men, see: 
Polyb., 1.26.7; REY DA SILVA, 2012, 50; PITASSI, 2011, 100.
72. Livy, 25.27.3.
73. HOYOS, 2015, 162.
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however, Bomilcar either still worried about the weather or simply los-
ing his nerve, panicked and fled towards Italy74. Thus without a naval 
battle even being fought, Rome was once again the undisputed master 
of Sicilian waters. Sicily would become fully pacified by 210, securing a 
significant strategic victory for Rome75. Without a Sicilian port, Hannibal 
would remain largely isolated from Carthage, and never had the troops or 
resources to deliver a finishing blow76. Just as important, however, is that 
Rome still had the means to invade Africa from Sicily, which would even-
tually lead to Roman victory. Through a combination of Roman daring and 
Carthaginian incompetence, Rome managed to hold onto Sicily and turn 
the tide of war in their favour77.
6. SARDINIA
Events in Sardinia can be seen as a mirror image, albeit on a small-
er scale, to Sicily. Like Sicily, Sardinia was very important to Rome as a 
source of grain78. Sardinia had also until recently, been under Carthaginian 
control and still had pro-Carthaginian remnants. Evidence of this wavering 
allegiance to Rome is that early in the war, the consul Gnaeus Servilius 
Geminus (cos. 217) sailed around both Corsica and Sardinia collecting 
local hostages to ensure loyalty79. Despite these efforts Sardinia still expe-
rienced revolts siding with Carthage. In 216, Hasdrubal ‘the Bald’ sailed 
to Sardinia with 60 quinqueremes to assist these revolts. Again, like Sicily 
these ships were blown off course and had to land at the Balearic Islands 
east of Hispania. This mishap allowed the Romans time to prepare and 
when the Carthaginians did finally bring reinforcements, they were swiftly 
defeated on land80. To worsen this failure, on their return to Africa they 
fell in with the main Roman fleet being led by Titus Otacilius Crassus (pr. 
217, II 214) who captured 7 of their ships81. After this event Sardinia was 
largely pacified although it remained an area where the Carthaginian fleet 
74. Livy, 25.27.10-12.
75. Livy, 26.40.18.
76. MACDONALD, 2015, 160.
77. THIEL (1946, 85-86) goes as far as to call Bomilcar ‘one of the most inferior admirals 
Carthage ever possessed’ and a ‘born do-nothing’.
78. For Sardinian grain supplies, see: Livy, 25.20.3. For Sicilian grain, see Livy, 22.37.1-6.
79. Livy, 22.31.1.
80. Livy, 23.34.16 and 23.40-41.
81. Livy, 23.41.8.
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managed to find refuge82. In 210 for example, 40 Carthaginian ships suc-
cessfully raided the island, and Scipio Africanus sent 50 warships from 
Hispania to protect the coasts as there were rumours of a fleet of 200 ships 
coming to attack83. These ended up being just rumours, however, and the 
only other action reported from Sardinia was the capture of 80 transports 
which may have been trying to reach Hannibal84. Through a combination 
of Carthaginian failures and Rome’s dedication to its provinces, Rome was 
able to secure grain supplies throughout the war and reduce attempts at 
Carthaginian insurrection to minor affairs.
7. MACEDONIA
Macedonia entered the war quite early on, but due to Roman naval 
power, they played an insignificant role. In 217, Phillip V King of Macedon, 
organized the construction of 100 Illyrian style small warships known as 
lemboi85. Polybius makes it explicit that
he needed a fleet and crews — not so much for fighting (he never 
expected to be capable of taking on the Romans by sea), as for troop 
transport86. 
These ships were launched towards Illyria, a Roman ally, but when 
the Illyrian king became concerned and contacted Rome, they sent 10 
warships from Lilybaeum to confront the Macedonians. Phillip, fearing 
that these 10 warships were part of a larger fleet, fled back to Macedonia87. 
For the next two years, Phillip would remain relatively inactive until the 
aftermath of Cannae when he sent envoys to Hannibal suggesting a pact 
of friendship between Carthage and Macedonia. These envoys were cap-
tured by Roman ships on their way back to Macedonia, and the terms 
were revealed to the Romans88. Polybius gives the terms of this pact, and 
while there is nothing explicitly mentioning Phillip invading Italy, Rome 
certainly feared the possibility89. 
82. RANKOV, 1996, 53-54. 
83. Livy, 27.6.13-14 and 27.22.
84. For an example of the difficulties involved with shipping supplies or troops to 
Hannibal in Italy from Africa without a port in-between, see: App., Hann. 8.54.
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Now taking the threat of Macedonia seriously, Rome launched a 
fleet of 30 warships under the command of Marcus Valerius Laevinus 
(cos. 210) to watch the sea between Brundisium and the Greek coast of 
Calabria90. Phillip did not disappoint and once again set about attacking 
Roman allies in Illyria. While besieging the river-side city of Apollonia, 
however, Laevinus arrived and placed his fleet at the river’s mouth to 
prevent Phillip’s escape by sea. Phillip now had two choices, either place 
his now fleet of 120 lemboi against Laevinus’ 30 quinqueremes or flee. 
Phillip chose the latter option, and decided to beach his fleet, burn it, 
and then marched back to Macedonia, not technically beaten but cer-
tainly disgraced91. With his fleet destroyed and himself humbled, Phillip 
would not take any further major naval actions throughout the remainder 
of the war92. Rome’s naval defeat of Macedon without coming to a single 
blow showcases how powerful Roman naval strength had grown. With 
just the presence of a fleet in the area of Brundisium, Rome was able to 
prevent Phillip from giving any help whatsoever to Hannibal throughout 
the war.
8. ITALY
All of Rome’s naval success outside of Italy certainly influenced the 
war with Hannibal. After Cannae, Hannibal moved south and focused on 
creating defections among Roman allies. This was no easy task, however, 
as the Italian allies were not one cohesive unit, but instead differed greatly 
in terms of culture, language, and local rivalries93. For example, the pow-
erful Apulian city of Arpi revolted and joined the Carthaginians in 216, 
shortly after Cannae94. This revolt certainly spurred many small communi-
ties to follow the example of Arpi. For many of the other powerful cities 
in the region such as Canusium and Teanum Apulum, however, this only 
strengthened their ties with Rome. Arpi’s move to join Carthage would 
have been seen as an attempt at strengthening their local hegemony at 
the expense of other Apulian cities. Therefore, Arpi’s defection ended up 
strengthening the Roman loyalty of other powerful cities in the area95.
90. MORRISON and COATES, 1996, 63.
91. Livy, 24.40.16-17.
92. Rome would also stir the Aetolian League in Greece to declare war on Phillip, 
diverting his attentions from Italy, see: ROSENSTEIN, 2012, 155-156.
93. ROSENSTEIN, 2012, 79.
94. Polyb., 3.118.3.
95. FRONDA, 2010, 56.
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Hannibal’s difficulties in inciting revolts can be seen most clearly in his 
struggles to secure a meaningful port city. After Cannae, Hannibal reached 
his peak of success in which Capua, the second most powerful city in 
Italy, revolted and took his side96. Along with Capua, Hannibal made his 
greatest alliances in southern Italy, most notably with the Bruttians and 
the Greek cities in the area97. According to Fronda, 
most of the Bruttians came over to his side rather quickly, perhaps even 
in the immediate wake of Cannae, and in the course of the following 
year nearly every Greek city along the coast of Bruttium had also been 
convinced to defect98. 
At first glance this would seem like a huge achievement for Hannibal 
as he now effectively controlled nearly all ports from the heel of Italy to 
the toe. In reality, however, Hannibal was still at a massive disadvantage. 
First of all, Tarentum, the major port city in the area, wasn’t captured by 
Hannibal until 212. Even then, a Roman garrison managed to hold out 
in the citadel which was, conveniently for Rome, located on the port. 
Meaning that throughout his occupation of Tarentum, Hannibal never had 
undisputed access to its port99. Even more important was that the port 
city of Rhegium, which controlled the strait of Messina between Sicily and 
Italy, remained loyal to Rome throughout the war100.
The port cities which Hannibal did obtain, notably Locri and Croton, 
ended up being only minor help. For example, Hannibal is mentioned 
to have received just one shipment of reinforcements from Carthage 
throughout the entirety of the war in 215. These reinforcements came in at 
Locri and it is worth mentioning that even though Carthage was success-
ful, Rome became aware of the shipment along the way and nearly inter-
cepted it101. The main problem with Hannibal’s port cities being on Italy’s 
southern coast was that Roman-controlled Sicily acted as barrier, meaning 
that in order to get to Locri or Croton a fleet would have to sail through 
enemy territory. The city of Syracuse particularly lays on the way to either 
Locri or Croton and would have been the ideal spot for a Carthaginian 
fleet to rest and resupply before moving on to Italy. By failing to retake 
Syracuse in 214-212, however, Carthage was left without an easy way of 
reaching Hannibal. 
96. Livy, 23.4.5-6. 
97. Diod. Sic., 26.13.1.
98. FRONDA, 2010, 186.
99. Livy, 25.11.11.
100. FRONDA, 2010, 178.
101. Livy, 23.41.10.
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Steinby suggests that there may have been much more triangular traf-
fic between Carthage, Syracuse, and Hannibal controlled Southern Italy 
than mentioned in the source material. Citing only Bomilcar’s flight to 
Tarentum after the failed relief of Syracuse in 211, Steinby states, ‘if there 
was such traffic, were the Romans able to stop it? Apparently not’102. Apart 
from this initial jump, she goes further by suggesting Bomilcar may have 
had a double mission involving communication with Hannibal, and that 
‘the whole scheme came very close to success’103. The exact nature of 
this proposed scheme, however, Steinby does not clarify. An analysis of 
the source material and understanding of ancient ship limitations, how-
ever, strongly suggests that there was no secret scheme between Hannibal 
and Bomilcar, or that there was any major traffic between Carthage and 
Southern Italy.
First of all, since the 19th century, scholarship has recognised that 
the most obvious reason Bomilcar fled to Tarentum was to blockade the 
Roman held garrison into submission104. This only reinforces the idea of 
Carthage being desperate to open up a meaningful port in Southern Italy 
and is contrary to Steinby’s speculation. Furthermore, Livy explicitly states 
that Bomilcar sent orders to his 700 transports, which he had left in south-
western Sicily at Heraclea, to return to Africa before his fleet of warships 
made a break for Tarentum105. If Bomilcar and his 130 warships were 
at Cape Pachynum near Syracuse, why were his 700 transports left in 
Heraclea 200 kilometres to the west? The obvious answer is that they 
were intentionally kept away from the Roman fleet. If Bomilcar had any 
hope of sending 700 packed transport ships into the harbour of Syracuse, 
he would have to either outright defeat the Romans or at least confirm 
that they would not have an opportunity to stop them from entering be-
fore taking the risk of sailing his vulnerable transports anywhere near 
Syracuse. As transport ships typically relied on sail power, they lacked the 
flexibility of travel possessed by oar powered warships. Therefore, when 
Bomilcar was confronted by the Roman naval force at Cape Pachynum 
south of Syracuse and decided to avoid a battle, his only option was to 
send the transports back to Africa. While Bomilcar’s oar powered war fleet 
could escape a similarly decked Roman fleet, his fleet of transports, rely-
102. STEINBY, 2007, 123. 
103. This proposed ‘double mission’ does not seem to come from any source other 
than Steinby’s own speculation, see: STEINBY, 2007, 123.
104. The theory already appears in a biography of Bomilcar from the 1860’s, see: 
SMITH, 1867, 499. Thiel (1946, 85-86) argues the same.
105. Livy, 25.27.12. 
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ing on the wind, would have had no such ability, and were thus rendered 
useless106. Instead of suggesting some sort of double mission or scheme, 
it is much more likely that Bomilcar, realising that he would not be able 
to retake Syracuse, simply changed plans, dismissed his transports from 
Heraclea, and made for Tarentum. This example used by Steiny to sug-
gest triangular traffic between Carthage, Syracuse and Southern Italy can, 
on the contrary, be used to show exactly why it likely did not occur on 
any significant scale. Instead, the troubles faced by Bomilcar even moving 
transports and supplies to Syracuse, much less to Italy, only confirms that 
Hannibal was largely isolated.
There was another large problem which arose due to Hannibal’s 
only port cities being on Italy’s southern coast. Unlike the Romans, in 
most cases Hannibal could not force the Italian allies into military ser-
vice107. While many of these allies would have provided troops to some 
degree, many actually ended up being more of a detriment rather than 
a support. For example, in most of the cities Hannibal captured he was 
forced to leave a garrison of his own troops. These troops would act as 
a show of force to prevent pro-Roman rebellion, but were also expected 
to protect the inhabitants when Rome inevitably came to retake their cit-
ies108. As Hannibal only had a limited amount of troops, he was forced to 
stay near his most powerful allies with his army, or run the risk of Rome 
coming and taking back a city while he was engaged elsewhere109. This 
was exactly what happened when Rome recaptured both Capua in 211 
and Tarentum in 209110. Furthermore, if Hannibal wanted to move north-
ward and focus on cities other than the south, he would have been forced 
to create long supply lines running from the southern coast towards these 
northern cities. Not only was Hannibal lacking troops to maintain 
these supply lines, but they would be easy targets for Roman attacks. In 
order to move effectively out of the south, therefore, Hannibal needed to 
have access to port cities on the northwest and northeast coasts of Italy111. 
These ports could then be used to receive supplies and operate through-
out all of Italy rather than being relegated to the south.
106. For a discussion on the speed and flexibility of rowing versus sailing ships, see: 
CASSON, 1971, 278-296.
107. RAWLINGS, 2011, 314.
108. ZIMMERMAN, 2011, 288.
109. LAZENBY, 1978, 78. 
110. For Rome’s retaking of Capua, see: Livy, 26.12.10-14. For Rome’s retaking of 
Tarentum, see: Plut., Vit. Fab. 22.3.
111. ERDKAMP, 2011, 75.
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Hannibal made attempts at ports on both the east and west coasts 
of Italy, but all of them resulted in failure. After Cannae, Hannibal tried 
to capture the powerful west coast city of Neapolis. According to Livy, 
‘He was eager to acquire a naval base, to enable his ships to cross safely 
from Africa’112. Neapolis would have been a much more direct route from 
Africa itself, but could also have been accessed if Sicilian or Sardinian 
ventures would have been successful. This was short lived, however, once 
he learned that it would be too much of an effort. Later in 212, Hannibal 
turned his attention to Brundisium on the southeast coast, as he believed 
that it would be betrayed to him113. Brundisium was likely seen as im-
portant due to the potential reinforcements from Greece which would 
be directly available. Like Neapolis, however, this effort also failed and 
Hannibal never managed to gain access to any port cities other than the 
few in the far south, which were very difficult for the Carthaginians to 
reach safely. 
Even with the ports of Neapolis and Brundisium, it’s hard to see this 
making a difference in the long-term outcome of the war. Essentially, 
Rome’s naval successes outside of Italy prevented Hannibal from receiv-
ing support regardless of the ports he achieved in Italy. The protection 
of Sicily and Sardinia made sending supplies directly from Africa a risky 
manoeuvre as there was always the chance of running into Roman ships. 
Phillip V had been neutralised through Roman naval intervention as well 
as local hostilities, and there is no evidence of him ever sending sup-
plies to Hannibal. Finally, with Rome’s successes on the coast of Hispania, 
Rome could send reinforcements to Hispania unhindered, whereas po-
tential Carthaginian reinforcements were effectively trapped inland. As a 
result, Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal would be forced to bring an army 
over the Alps in 207 to bring aid and reinforcements114. Hasdrubal would 
never reach his brother, however, as he and his army were annihilated by 
the Romans along the way115. With Rome’s navy successfully defending its 
coasts and protecting the majority of its port cities, Hannibal was never 
able to receive the manpower and supplies necessary to defeat or secure 
good terms with Rome.
112. Livy, 23.15.1.
113. Livy, 25.22.14.
114. Livy, 27.39.1. 
115. For an account of the battle, see: Livy, 27.49-50.
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9. AFRICA
If not for the successes of Hannibal, the African coast may have been 
the scene of large scale naval battles reminiscent of the First Punic War. In 
218, the consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus (cos. 218) was sent to Sicily 
with 160 warships with the intention of crossing into Africa116. This mis-
sion, however, would be aborted prematurely as Sempronius’ colleague 
Publius Scipio had his hands full with Hannibal in northern Italy. As a 
result, Sempronius was recalled to come to Scipio’s aid where he would 
ultimately be commander during the disastrous Battle of Trebia117. While 
Hannibal’s intentions are impossible to tell from the source material, it 
may very well have been that one of his main aims in invading Italy was 
to keep the Romans away from Africa118. If this was his intention it cer-
tainly worked for the most part119. Livy mentions multiple Roman raids 
of the African coast, largely successful, but they are referenced in pass-
ing, without much elaboration. In fact, the first actual battle described 
in Africa happened in 208 when the war effort had already been turning 
against Carthage. Although late in the war, these naval battles are the larg-
est in terms of ships involved. The first involving a Roman fleet of 100 
warships under the now proconsul Marcus Valerius Laevinus versus that 
of a Carthaginian fleet of 83 warships. The result being a Roman victory 
and the capture of 18 Carthaginian ships120. The second battle occurred 
a year later in 207, also under Laevinus, involving 70 Carthaginian ships 
and a similar result121. Like previous accounts involving Africa, these bat-
tles are described by Livy as raids in which the fleets goal was to sail to 
Africa, burn and loot the countryside, and then return to Italy. On both 
occasions, however, a Carthaginian fleet learned of the ravaging and inter-
cepted the Roman fleet leading to impromptu battles. 
Contrary to Livy, Steinby argues that these confrontations were not the 
result of raids at all but were concentrated efforts to find and destroy the 
Punic navy122. This interpretation, however, is directly at odds with Livy’s 
116. App., Hisp. 3.14.
117. Livy, 21.51.5.
118. ZIMMERMAN, 2011, 290.
119. For the difficulties in determining motives and the psychology of ancient figures, 
see: LEVENE, 2010, 164.
120. Livy, 27.29.7-8.
121. Livy, 28.4.5-7.
122. STEINBY (2007, 127) states, ‘When we read Livy, we get the idea that the Roman 
motive for going to Africa was to pillage the coastal area’. In actuality, it is quite clear from 
Livy’s description that he is referring to raids, see: Livy, 27.29.7-8, 28.4.5-7.
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account. For example, in the battle of 208, Livy describes the Romans as 
being taken by surprise of the reports of an incoming Carthaginian fleet. 
Similarly, in 207, the battle only occurs after Laevinus has finished raiding 
the coast with his ships full of plunder when he unexpectedly encoun-
ters an enemy fleet on his return to Sicily. Besides the evidence to the 
contrary, Steinby’s argument fails when observing the situation from a 
purely strategic standpoint. Since the disaster at Cannae, Rome had largely 
been following Quintus Fabius Maximus’ (cos. 233, II 228, III 215, IV 214, 
V 209) conservative strategy of warfare123. In 208 the war had certainly 
begun to turn in Rome’s favour, but Carthage was still far from defeated124. 
Taking this into consideration, would Rome risk sailing into Carthaginian 
territory for the purpose of a large naval battle? Rome already had the ad-
vantage of sailing to Africa quite easily from Lilybaeum as they had been 
throughout the war. Defeating the Carthaginian fleet in African waters 
would have changed little strategically. A Roman defeat, however, could 
have spelled complete disaster as it would have left Sicily and possibly 
Italy with weakened naval defences on its coasts. Steinby’s suggestion of 
Roman naval attempts to crush the Punic navy in its own waters is not 
only directly contrary to Livy, but would have been all risk and no reward 
operations. Instead, Livy’s accounts of raids on the African coast make 
much more sense from a strategic perspective. These raids would force 
the Carthaginians to divert forces and resources to defend their coasts, 
while posing much less risk to the Romans.
From Livy’s descriptions of these raids, it can be concluded that 
like the rest of the Mediterranean, Rome held an advantage even in the 
Carthaginian’s own waters125. The main reason being the geography of 
Africa itself. Due to the wide expanse of the North African coast, a Roman 
fleet could sail out from Sicily and attack a variety of port cities. This 
can be observed in the raid turned impromptu battles of 208 and 207, 
with Rome first raiding the coast of Clupea and the next year raiding the 
coast around Utica. The Carthaginian fleet simply didn’t have the ability to 
stretch itself enough to protect the entire coastline of their North African 
territory126. Whereas the Romans could be quite sure where a Carthaginian 
123. For example, even major offensives such as the retaking of Syracuse were largely 
a response to Carthaginian initiatives, see Sicily section above.
124. The first raid turned impromptu battle occurred before the significant defeat of 
Hasdrubal in 207, see: Livy, 27.49-50.
125. Livy mentions the only Carthaginian victory of any significant size at sea involv-
ing the capture of 60 transports. This battle, however, occurred in the last year of the war 
when Carthage was already on the brink of defeat, see: Livy, 30.10.8-21.
126. RANKOV, 1996, 56.
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fleet would attack say in Sicily, Carthage would have to guess as nearly 
all of their most important cities lay on the coast127. Furthermore, without 
any holdings outside of Africa, Carthage would have no way of knowing 
when Roman fleets were approaching or operating in their territory, un-
like Rome with Sicily and Sardinia. Instead, they would be forced to wait 
for a Roman fleet to attack, learn of its whereabouts, and then attempt to 
intercept the fleet before it returned to Italy or Sicily. This can be seen 
clearly in the crossing of Scipio Africanus in 204, in which no Carthaginian 
resistance of any sort is mentioned128. The geography of the African coast 
was simply not advantageous in mounting naval defence, with the result 
being largely unrestrained Roman raids and eventual victory. While not a 
major theatre early in the war, it would ultimately be the scene of the final 
defeat of Carthage at Zama.
10. CONCLUSIONS
Naval warfare during the time of the Second Punic War had many 
limitations which played a large part in the final outcome of the war. 
Ancient ships used labour intensive oar power and didn’t have much 
room for supplies meaning that friendly ports were necessary for fleets 
to be active for an extended time. As Rome was able to take control of 
the coast of Hispania, they made it very difficult for reinforcements to 
move by sea due to a lack of friendly ports outside of Africa. This was 
made even more difficult by Rome’s continual protection of the coasts of 
Sicily and Sardinia, which hindered Carthage from raiding Italy or sending 
reinforcements to Hannibal. Conversely, there was nothing stopping 
Roman ships from freely raiding Africa and, eventually, transporting the 
army to win the war. The Macedonian threat was also neutralised through 
Rome’s simultaneous defence of the Italian coast and attack on Phillip V’s 
forces in Greece. Essentially, Rome maintained and improved its abilities 
to ship troops and supplies throughout the Mediterranean, while Carthage 
simultaneously lost this ability. The longer the war went on, the more 
the lack of Carthaginian reinforcements would be felt, greatly weakening 
Hannibal in Italy. As a result of this long-term strategy, Hannibal was 
reduced to relative inactivity in the later years of the war, until he was 
forced to leave Italy to defend his homeland, leading to his eventual 
defeat at Zama.
127. The obvious choices described above as Lilybaeum and Syracuse.
128. Livy, 29.27.13.
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